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REFORM AFTER THE REFORM ACT 
Kendra Schramm* 
INTRODUCTION 
The first federal securities laws were enacted in the wake of a 
financial crisis and the Great Depression.1 As part of the New 
Deal, the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) was designed to 
create transparency in companies that offer securities to the 
investing public (“issuers”).2 The following year, the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) was passed, creating a 
system of regulation for broker-dealers, securities associations, and 
exchanges.3 In simple terms, these laws require issuers to provide 
                                                          
* Brooklyn Law School, J.D. Candidate, 2011. 
1 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a–aa (West 2010); 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a–lll (West 2010). 
2 FDR Press Conference May 31, 1935, NEW DEAL NETWORK, http://new 
deal.feri.org/court/fdr5_31_35.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2010) (“The Securities 
Act . . . was intended to prevent nationally the issuing of securities to the 
investing or speculating public under false pretenses. The Act required that, 
through a central Federal organization, securities that were proposed to be issued 
should have the full truth stated about them.”); see § 77b (“The term ‘issuer’ 
means every person who issues or proposes to issue any security . . . .”). 
3 §§ 78a–lll.  See § 78b: 
[T]ransactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities 
exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a national 
public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and 
control of such transactions and of practices and matters related thereto 
. . . to require appropriate reports to remove impediments to and perfect 
the mechanisms of a national market system for securities . . . and to 
impose requirements necessary to make such regulation and control 
reasonably complete and effective, in order to protect interstate 
commerce, the national credit, the Federal taxing power, to protect and 
make more effective the national banking system and Federal Reserve 
System, and to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets in 
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regular and reliable financial disclosure to the investing public4 
and prohibit fraudulent conduct in connection with the purchase or 
sale of securities.5 In enacting these laws and their subsequent 
amendments,6 Congress intended to “promote investor 
                                                          
such transactions. 
4 This includes quarterly and annual filings of financial statements with the 
SEC as well as special disclosure for triggering events such as bankruptcy, 
mergers and acquisitions, and changes in corporate governance or management. 
See, e.g., Form 8-K, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form8k.htm (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2010) (“In addition to filing annual reports on Form 10-K and 
quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, public companies must report certain material 
corporate events on a more current basis. Form 8-K is the ‘current report’ 
companies must file with the SEC to announce major events that shareholders 
should know about.”); Form 10-K, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form10k. 
htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2010) (“The annual report on Form 10-K provides a 
comprehensive overview of the company’s business and financial condition and 
includes audited financial statements.”); Form 10-Q, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/ 
answers/form10q.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2010) (“The Form 10-Q includes 
unaudited financial statements and provides a continuing view of the company’s 
financial position during the year. The report must be filed for each of the first 
three fiscal quarters of the company’s fiscal year.”). 
5 See §§ 77a–aa, 78a–lll; see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 
185, 195 (1976): 
The Securities Act of 1933 was designed to provide investors with full 
disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of 
securities in commerce, to protect investors against fraud and, through 
the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical standards 
of honesty and fair dealing. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was 
intended principally to protect investors against manipulation of stock 
prices through regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges and 
in over-the-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting 
requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national securities 
exchanges. 
6 See, e.g., Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77aaa–bbbb (West 
2010) (supplementing the Securities Act of 1933 in regard to debt securities); 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at various sections of 
15, 18 U.S.C.); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-1–64 
(West 2010) (establishing standards for regulation of investment companies “to 
mitigate and . . . eliminate the conditions . . . which adversely affect the national 
public interest and the interest of investors”); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80b-1–21 (West 2010) (establishing standards for regulation of 
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confidence . . . and thereby to encourage the investment necessary 
for capital formation, economic growth, and job creation.”7 
Violations of the securities laws, which generally consist of 
fraudulent conduct, preclude investors from effectively monitoring 
the performance of a public company and its management, and 
often cause inflation of stock price.8 There are several avenues 
through which federal securities laws are enforced; the government 
brings civil actions, administrative actions,9 and criminal 
prosecutions10 and private parties bring direct and derivative 
actions.11 
This Note will focus on the enforcement of federal securities 
laws12 through private class action litigation, which is governed in 
part by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(“PSLRA” or “Reform Act”), an amendment to the Exchange 
Act.13 Additionally, this Note will discuss the primary legislative 
goal behind the creation of the Reform Act: to reduce the incidence 
of meritless litigation.14 Although some provisions of the Reform 
Act were successful in promoting this narrow goal,15 this 
                                                          
investment advisers). 
7 S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 
683. 
8 Marilyn F. Johnson et al., In re Silicon Graphics, Inc.: Shareholder 
Wealth Effects Resulting from the Interpretation of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act’s Pleading Standard, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 773, 778 (2000) 
[hereinafter Shareholder Wealth]. 
9 See infra notes 26–32 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 33–43 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 44–55 and accompanying text. 
12 Although not addressed in this Note, it is also important to consider the 
role of state securities laws, commonly referred to as ‘Blue Sky’ laws and the 
contribution of state attorneys general and state regulatory agencies in 
monitoring the integrity of markets and protecting investors, see generally 
Michael J. Missal et al., Blue Sky Enforcement: The Increasing Activism of State 
Securities Regulators, in THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 523–53 (2d 
ed. 2007); see also N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS’N, http://www.nasaa.org/ (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2010). 
13 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
14 S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 
683.  
15 See infra Part I.B. 
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legislation is not entirely compatible with the broader legislative 
purpose behind the creation of private rights of action for 
violations of the federal securities laws. Such suits were meant not 
only to provide a means for making injured shareholders whole 
through the recovery of damages,16 but also to help promote 
diligence and deter misconduct—“to guarantee that corporate 
officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and others properly perform 
their jobs.”17 Ultimately, shareholder litigation is beneficial 
because it creates the perception that individuals will be held liable 
for their misconduct.18 This deters violations of the federal 
securities laws because individuals are sensitive to liability 
exposure.19 In turn, the perception of enforcement increases the 
confidence of the investing public and, thereby, the efficiency of 
capital markets.20 This Note suggests that additional reform for the 
structure of private securities litigation and greater public 
enforcement is necessary to compensate defrauded investors and to 
deter violations of the securities laws. 
Part I of this Note will provide general background information 
regarding the federal securities laws; briefly explain liability under 
                                                          
16 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), 
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730 (“Private securities litigation is an 
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their losses 
without having to rely upon government action.”). 
17 Id. See also James D. Cox, Private Litigation and the Deterrence of 
Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (1997) 
(“Compensating the injured and deterring future violations are frequently seen 
as complementary objectives of private suits.”). 
18 See generally Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of 
Employment Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 431 (1999) 
(“General deterrence requires public knowledge of disputes and their 
disposition. Potential violators can appreciate the threat of sanctions only when 
they learn that similarly situated actors have been punished. This knowledge 
enables them to calculate the costs and benefits of engaging in the prohibited 
conduct.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
19 Susanne Mast Murray & Fred T. Podolsky, Protecting Your Directors 
and Officers from Liability: Examining Indemnification and Insurance, in WHAT 
EVERY DIRECTOR & OFFICER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT D&O COVERAGE 2005, at 
56 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 1519, 2005), 
available at Westlaw, 1519 PLI/Corp 53. 
20 See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 318 
(2007). 
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the provisions that plaintiffs invoke most frequently, Section 10(b) 
of the Exchange Act21 and SEC Rule 10b-5;22 and discuss 
significant provisions of the Reform Act.23 Part II will argue for 
additional reform of private enforcement, including the 
codification of a private right of action for aiding and abetting 
violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Part III will consider 
enhanced criminal enforcement as an alternative form of 
deterrence. This Note will conclude by suggesting that deterrence, 
however achieved, should be the focus of additional reform.  
I. BACKGROUND 
The Exchange Act created the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“Commission” or “SEC”),24 a regulatory agency that 
seeks “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient 
markets, and facilitate capital formation.”25 The SEC issues rules 
and regulations necessary to enforce the federal securities laws.26 It 
also has the authority to investigate violations27 and to bring civil 
                                                          
21 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (West 2010): 
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
22 Rule 10b-5 was promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (West 2010). 
23 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
24 See § 78d. 
25 The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains 
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/ 
about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Sept. 24, 2010) [hereinafter What We Do]. 
26 15 U.S.C.A. § 77s (West 2010) (“The Commission shall have authority . 
. . to make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary 
to carry out the provisions of this title . . . .”). 
27 § 78u(a)(1) (“The Commission may, in its discretion, make such 
investigations as it deems necessary to determine whether any person has 
violated, is violating, or is about to violate any provision of this chapter, the 
rules or regulations thereunder . . . .”).  
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and administrative actions.28 Through these actions, the SEC 
generally seeks injunctions,29 fines,30 and sanctions.31 It may also 
seek disgorgement of ill-gotten gains and use the recovered funds 
to compensate investors for their losses.32  
                                                          
28 The SEC enforces the following laws: Securities Act of 1934, Exchange 
Act of 1934, Trust Indenture Act of 1939, Investment Company Act of 1940, 
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, and Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. What We 
Do, supra note 25. 
29 § 78u(d)(1): 
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged 
or is about to engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of any 
provision of this chapter, the rules or regulations thereunder . . . it may 
in its discretion bring an action . . . to enjoin such acts or practices . . . . 
30 See e.g., § 78u(d)(3)(A): 
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person has 
violated any provision of this chapter, the rules or regulations 
thereunder . . . the Commission may bring an action in a United States 
district court to seek, and the court shall have jurisdiction to impose, 
upon a proper showing, a civil penalty to be paid by the person who 
committed such violation. 
31 Courts may bar defendants who violate the anti-fraud provisions of the 
securities laws from future service in the management of a public company. § 
77t(e): 
[T]he court may prohibit, conditionally or unconditionally, and 
permanently or for such period of time as it shall determine, any person 
who violated section 77q(a)(1) of this title from acting as an officer or 
director of any issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant to 
section 78l of this title or that is required to file reports pursuant to 
section 78o(d) of this title if the person’s conduct demonstrates 
unfitness to serve as an officer or director of any such issuer. 
A study of actions between 1978 and 2004 found 697 enforcement actions by 
the SEC and DOJ, on average, fewer than 27 per year. These resulted in close to 
4,500 sanctions against individuals, hundreds of whom were barred from future 
service in public corporations and financial institutions. John C. Coffee, Jr., Law 
and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 275 (2007) 
[hereinafter Law and the Market] (internal citation omitted). 
32 § 78u(d)(5) (“In any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the 
Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may 
seek, and any Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that may be 
appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors.”). Pursuant to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, the SEC can compensate investors through the Federal 
Account for Investor Restitution provision, or ‘Fair Funds.’ 15 U.S.C.A. § 
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On the criminal side of public enforcement, the Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”) has authority to prosecute securities fraud33 and 
other related offenses, such as conspiracy,34 mail and wire fraud,35 
failure of corporate officers to certify financial reports,36 and 
racketeering.37 Convicted persons may be imprisoned up to five 
years for willfully violating the Securities Act38 and up to twenty 
years for offenses such as obstruction of justice by alteration or 
destruction of documents.39 In addition to incarceration, the DOJ 
                                                          
7246(a) (West 2010). See e.g., SEC v. Henke, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1086 (N.D. 
Cal. 2003) (applying § 7246(a)). But see infra notes 164–69 and accompanying 
text.  
33 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1348 (West 2010).  
34 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (West 2010) (conspiracy to commit offense or to 
defraud the United States); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1349 (West 2010) (attempt and 
conspiracy).  
35 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2010) (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 
(West 2010) (wire fraud). 
36 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2010). 
37 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962 (West 2010). A study of criminal actions 
between 1978 and 2004 found 755 individuals were indicted, resulting in 543 
guilty pleas and only 10 acquittals; “[a] total of 1230.7 years of incarceration 
and 397.5 years of probation were imposed (with the average being 4.2 years).” 
Law and the Market, supra note 31, at 275–76 (“Since the Department of 
Justice’s Corporate Fraud Task Force was formed in 2002 in the wake of Enron, 
it has charged over 1300 defendants and obtained over 1000 guilty pleas and 
convictions.”). 
38 15 U.S.C.A. § 77x (West 2010): 
Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this 
subchapter, or the rules and regulations promulgated by the 
Commission under authority thereof, or any person who willfully, in a 
registration statement filed under this subchapter, makes any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omits to state any material fact required 
to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not 
misleading, shall upon conviction be fined not more than $10,000 or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
39 Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1519 (West 2010). This 
legislation “imposes more stringent governance and accounting control 
requirements on public companies in an effort to deter fraud.” Marilyn F. 
Johnson, Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 627, 649 (2007) [hereinafter Do 
Merits Matter More?]: 
These mechanisms may reduce companies’ litigation risk by reducing 
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may seek criminal fines,40 forfeiture,41 or restitution.42 The DOJ 
also has the authority to use recovered funds to compensate 
investors for their losses.43 
Finally, an issuer, its directors and officers,44 and, in some 
cases, outside entities such as auditors and underwriters may be 
held civilly liable in direct or derivative actions.45 Several 
provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts expressly create 
private rights of action for violations of the federal securities 
                                                          
the overall incidence of fraud. On the other hand, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act also requires the chief executive officer and the chief financial 
officer to certify their company’s financial results, which could expose 
these executives and their companies to additional litigation risk 
because it provides additional evidence of scienter if those financial 
results are misstated. Litigation risk may also have been increased by 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s lengthening of the statute of limitations for 
securities fraud claims. 
40 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 1519 (2010) 
41 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 981 (West 2010) (civil forfeiture); 18 U.S.C.A. § 982 
(West 2010) (criminal forfeiture). 
42 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663 (West 2010) (restitution). 
43 See infra notes 164–69 and accompanying text. 
44 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77o (West 2010): 
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or 
otherwise, or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or 
understanding with one or more other persons by or through stock 
ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under 
sections 77k or 77l of this title, shall also be liable jointly and severally 
with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to 
whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person 
had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence 
of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is 
alleged to exist. 
15 U.S.C.A. § 78t(a) (West 2010): 
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable 
under any provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation 
thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the 
same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such 
controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good 
faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting 
the violation of cause of action. 
45 See infra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.  
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laws.46 For example, liability results from material misstatements 
or omissions in registration statements,47 violations of registration 
and prospectus provisions,48 use of false or misleading 
prospectuses or communications in connection with offers or sales 
of a security,49 manipulation of security prices,50 false filings with 
the SEC,51 and insider trading.52 These claims are, usually, 
consolidated into class actions where the plaintiffs are numerous 
and geographically scattered53 and their claims are not cost-
effective to litigate individually.54 These actions also supplement 
the efforts and resources of the SEC and DOJ in policing market 
integrity.55 
                                                          
46 Acting as private attorneys general, individual and class plaintiffs 
‘vindicate the public interest’ through private enforcement of securities laws. 
Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943); Michael A. Perino, 
Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 
913, 918 (2003) [hereinafter Did PSLRA Work?] (“Giving private attorneys a 
financial stake in the outcome of a case effectively deputizes them to search out 
fraud cases that the resource-constrained SEC may be unable to bring.” (citing 
Ickes, 134 F.2d at 704)). 
47 See § 77k. 
48 See § 77l(a)(1). 
49 See § 77l(a)(2). 
50 See § 78i(e). 
51 See § 78r(a). 
52 See § 78t-1(a). 
53 See, e.g., 7 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS 
ACTIONS § 22:16 (4th ed. 2010) (“In cases involving securities traded on the 
national stock exchanges, class members are usually so geographically dispersed 
and numerous that the joinder impracticability requirement is easily satisfied.”). 
54 See PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER, L.L.P., SECURITIES LAW 
CLAIMS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 157 (2004): 
The class action is widely viewed as a favored device for pursuing and 
managing shareholder lawsuits based on alleged violations of the 
federal securities laws . . . . [T]he United States Supreme Court 
recognized . . . grouping smaller, individual shareholder claims by 
means of the class action device promotes judicial efficiency and 
equalizes the relative power of the litigants. 
(citing Philips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (“Class actions . . . 
may permit the plaintiff to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate 
individually . . . .”)). 
55 See Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 376 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
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A. Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC 
Rule 10b-5 
Private plaintiffs most frequently assert claims under the broad 
and general anti-fraud provisions, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.56 
Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the SEC under Section 10(b), provides 
that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by 
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or 
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.57 
Although neither Section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 expressly 
creates a private civil remedy, trial courts consistently recognized 
an implied right of action and this practice was eventually affirmed 
by the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.58  
To prevail on a claim for a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5, a plaintiff must establish several elements: (1) standing, 
                                                          
dissenting); Law and the Market, supra note 31, at 267 (internal citations 
omitted). 
56 See SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 121 (1st Cir. 2008), reh’g granted, 
573 F.3d 54 (2009) (“Because of its broad scope and its availability to private 
plaintiffs, Rule 10b-5 ‘is the most commonly used basis for private suits 
charging fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.’” (citing 3 
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SEC. REG. § 12.4[1] (5th ed. 
2005))). 
57 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (West 2010). 
58 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976). 
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through the purchase or sale of the security in question; (2) a 
misstatement or omission by the defendant;59 (3) materiality of the 
misstatement or omission; (4) that the defendant acted with 
scienter—having “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud”;60 (5) the plaintiff’s reliance on the 
misstatement or omission in the purchase or sale of the security in 
question; (6) loss causation; and (7) damages.61 Proof of actual 
reliance is unnecessary because of the fraud-on-the-market theory, 
which assumes that “[a]n investor who buys or sells stock at the 
price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that 
price.”62  
Prior to 1994, each of the circuit courts also recognized an 
implied right of action against parties indirectly responsible for 
fraudulent activities on the theory of aiding and abetting violations 
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.63 Plaintiffs were required to 
                                                          
59 For example, a frequent, although not necessarily fraudulent, cause of an 
issuer’s misstatement is a violation of the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles that results in an earnings restatement. See Do Merits Matter More?, 
supra note 39, at 633–34; see generally Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles, FED. ACCT. STANDARDS ADVISORY BD., http://www.fasab.gov/ 
accepted.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2010). 
60 Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12. 
61 See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 
148 (2008). 
62 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242, 247 (1988) (“Because most 
publicly available information is reflected in market price, an investor’s reliance 
on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for 
purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.”). 
63 See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 
511 U.S. 164, 192 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A]ll 11 Courts of Appeals 
to have considered the question have recognized a private cause of action 
against aiders and abettors under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.” (citing Cleary v. 
Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983); IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 
909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980); Monsen v. Consol. Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 
799–800 (3d Cir. 1978); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 496–97 (4th Cir. 
1991); Fine v. Am. Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 300 (5th Cir. 1990); Moore 
v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987); 
Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 947 (7th Cir. 1989); K & S P’ship v. 
Cont’l Bank, N.A., 952 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1991); Levine v. Diamanthuset, 
Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991); Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & 
Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir. 1992); Schneberger v. Wheeler, 859 F.2d 
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establish proof of “(1) a primary violation by another person; (2) 
the aider and abettor’s ‘knowledge’ of the primary violation; and 
(3) substantial assistance by the aider and abettor in the 
achievement or consummation of the primary violation.”64 These 
actions were brought against outside entities—“reputational 
intermediaries who provide verification and certification services 
to investors . . . .”65 Consistent with the stated goals of securities 
legislation, typical defendants included auditors, rating agencies, 
securities analysts, investment bankers, and attorneys.66 Also 
                                                          
1477, 1480 (11th Cir. 1988); Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(recognizing, indirectly, aiding and abetting in private actions under Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5))). 
64 Rosenberg, 943 F.2d at 495. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 876(b) (1979) (providing liability for the fraudulent conduct of another 
when one “knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives 
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other”); Richard C. Mason, Civil 
Liability for Aiding and Abetting, 61 BUS. LAW. 1135 (2006) (discussing the 
elements of aiding and abetting liability). 
65 John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, 
Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1404 (2002): 
These services can consist of verifying a company’s financial 
statements (as the independent auditor does), evaluating the 
creditworthiness of the company (as the debt rating agency does), 
assessing the company’s business and financial prospects vis-à-vis its 
rivals (as the securities analyst does), or appraising the fairness of a 
specific transaction (as the investment banker does in delivering a 
fairness opinion). Lawyers can also be gatekeepers when they lend their 
professional reputations to a transaction . . . . Characteristically, the 
professional gatekeeper essentially assesses or vouches for the 
corporate client’s own statements about itself or a specific transaction. 
See also Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 
415–16 (2008) (citing Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a 
Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986)). 
66 See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. See generally Mason, 
supra note 64 (discussing common aiding and abetting claims); Don J. 
McDermott, Jr., Liability for Aiding and Abetting Violations of Rule 10b-5: The 
Recklessness Standard in Civil Damage Actions, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1087, 1088 n.6 
(1984) (“[M]any types of defendants are subject to secondary liability when they 
have some connection with a defendant who has violated an express prohibition 
of the securities laws . . . includ[ing] banks, . . . stock exchanges, . . . 
accountants, . . . and brokers.”); id. at 1089 n.10 (citing, as an example, a case in 
which plaintiffs asserted claims for aiding and abetting against “(1) 12 
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referred to as “gatekeepers,” they are, in theory, “de facto cops on 
the beat,”67 who may have the opportunity to prevent fraud and 
“likely have less to gain and more to lose from firm delicts than 
inside managers.”68 
However, in a dramatic deviation from the circuit courts, the 
Supreme Court held in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. that there is no implied private 
right of action for aiding and abetting under Section 10(b) or Rule 
10b-5.69 Despite significant objections, the Reform Act was passed 
the next year without overturning that decision.70 In 2008, the 
Supreme Court affirmed Central Bank in Stoneridge Investment 
Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.71 and recent attempts to codify a 
private right of action have been unsuccessful.72 Consequently, 
only the government may bring actions for aiding and abetting.73 
                                                          
brokerage firms that executed stock transactions for the president, (2) 16 
individuals associated with those firms, (3) the New York Stock Exchange, (4) a 
different bank, (5) the bank’s outside accountants, (6) the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, and (7) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation”). 
67 Kim, supra note 65, at 416. 
68 Id. However, it is generally noted that gatekeepers do not always have 
the capacity to detect and interdict misconduct and that this method of policing 
may not be as effective as internal corporate governance. See, e.g., id. at 412 (“If 
we want companies to fuse high performance with high integrity, the place to 
begin—and to be most effective—is inside the company itself. Outside 
regulators and gatekeepers can never be as potent and preventative as internal 
governance on the front lines from the CEO on down.” (quoting Ben W. 
Heineman, Jr., former general counsel, General Electric Co.)). 
69 See generally Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
70 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Cent. 
Bank, 511 U.S. at 196 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Of course, when a decision 
of this Court upsets settled law, Congress may step in to reinstate the old law.”). 
71 Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 155–56 
(2008). 
72 See infra notes 133–35 and accompanying text.  
73 See id.; 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-2(a)(2) (West 2010) (authorizing SEC to 
assess money penalties for aiding or abetting securities law violations). This is 
also an indictable offense. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2(a) (West 2010) (criminal liability 
for aiding and abetting the commission of an offense against the United States). 
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B. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
In 1995, Congress overrode a presidential veto74 and passed the 
Reform Act.75 In the decade leading up to this legislation, the 
perceived trend in securities litigation was for plaintiffs to leverage 
the burdensome costs of litigation and discovery against 
defendants, to induce settlement, regardless of the merits of their 
asserted claims.76 Liability was often based on a theory referred to 
as “fraud by hindsight”—meaning that “a sudden drop in a 
company’s stock price was evidence that the issuer and its 
                                                          
74 See Veto Message from the President, H.R. DOC. NO. 104-150, reprinted 
in 141 CONG. REC. H15214–15 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995): 
I am not [] willing to sign legislation that will have the effect of closing 
the courthouse door on investors who have legitimate claims . . . . This 
country is blessed by strong and vibrant markets and I believe that they 
function best when corporations can raise capital by providing investors 
with their best good-faith assessment of future prospects, without fear 
of costly, unwarranted litigation. But I also know that our markets are 
as strong and effective as they are because they operate—and are seen 
to operate—with integrity . . . . While it is true that innocent companies 
are hurt by frivolous lawsuits and that valuable information may be 
withheld from investors when companies fear the risk of such suits, it is 
also true that there are innocent investors who are defrauded and who 
are able to recover their losses only because they can go to court. 
75 109 Stat. 737. 
76 See 141 CONG. REC. H15220 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of 
Rep. Hastert): 
[S]pectators are misusing the law to virtually extort money from honest 
companies when no fraud has taken place. Frivolous class action suits 
are being filed . . . often forcing innocent companies to settle out of 
court rather than face massive court fees . . . . [D]uring the last 3 years, 
one out of every 12 companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
was sued for securities fraud. 
See also In re Heritage Bond Litig., 546 F.3d 667, 677 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“Congress passed the PSLRA because it was distressed with the proliferation 
and cost of allegedly meritless federal securities class actions. The PSLRA 
sought to curb abusive and frivolous securities suits by imposing new procedural 
and substantive requirements.” (citing U.S. Mortgage, Inc. v. Saxton, 494 F.3d 
833, 841 (9th Cir. 2007))); In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 
978 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that Congress enacted the PSLRA in part to prevent 
abusive actions designed to “impose costs so burdensome that it [was] often 
economical for the victimized party to settle”).  
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management covered up the bad news that led to the price drop.”77 
Prior to the enactment of the Reform Act, approximately 93 
percent of private securities class actions settled.78 In addition, 
Congress reported finding evidence of several abusive practices: 
(1) the routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of securities 
and others whenever there is a significant change in an 
issuer’s stock price, without regard to any underlying 
culpability of the issuers, and with only faint hope that the 
discovery process might lead eventually to some plausible 
cause of action;  
(2) the targeting of deep pocket defendants, including 
accountants, underwriters, and individuals who may be 
covered by insurance, without regard to their actual 
culpability; 
(3) the abuse of the discovery process to impose costs so 
burdensome that it is often economical for the victimized 
party to settle; and  
(4) the manipulation by class action lawyers of the clients 
whom they purportedly represent.79 
The general perception was that these “strike suits”80 only 
benefitted plaintiffs’ attorneys, who were awarded large fees,81 
                                                          
77 Shareholder Wealth, supra note 8, at 774. 
78 141 CONG. REC. S17934-04 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
D’Amato). 
79 See id. 
80 See generally Cal. Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 
98 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The PSLRA was intended to curtail ‘strike suits’—i.e., 
meritless class actions alleging fraud in the sale of securities.” (citing H.R. REP. 
NO. 105-803 (1998) (Conf. Rep.))). 
81 See, e.g., PAUL, HASTINGS, supra note 54, at 164 (“Plaintiffs’ attorneys 
were taking an unconscionable share of class action settlements[] and [t]his 
abusive litigation was causing an enormous cost to business that was inevitably 
passed on to consumers and society as a whole without achieving sufficient 
countervailing benefits.”); Did PSLRA Work?, supra note 46, at 918 
(“Compensation of attorneys performing this function is invariably through 
contingency fees. Those fees, which historically have ranged from twenty to 
thirty percent of recovery, are intended to compensate attorneys for litigation 
risk and for costs associated with searching out and prosecuting fraud claims.” 
(citing John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The 
Implications of Economic Theory of Private Enforcement Law Through Class 
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rather than shareholders, who typically recovered only pennies on 
the dollar.82 In response, legislators sought to reduce meritless 
litigation and settlement through several provisions of the Reform 
Act,83 which (1) created special class action requirements,84 (2) 
provided a statutory safe harbor for certain forward-looking 
statements,85 (3) imposed a heightened pleading standard,86 (4) set 
forth a scheme of proportionate liability,87 and (5) instituted a 
mandatory bar on contribution among co-defendants after partial 
                                                          
and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 679 (1986) (noting that the 
“system should encourage the attorney to invest in search costs and seek out 
violations of the law that are profitable for him to challenge”))).  
Attorneys acting with insufficient monitoring had incentives to act 
primarily in their own self-interest, often to the detriment of the 
deterrent and compensation functions they were supposed to perform. 
Under these circumstance, attorneys had incentives to bring marginal or 
nonmeritorious cases for their settlement value, not because they 
believed that fraud actually occurred. 
Id. at 920. 
82 141 CONG. REC. S17934 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
D’Amato).  
83 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The 
PSLRA was enacted “(1) to encourage the voluntary disclosure of information 
by corporate issuers; (2) to empower investors so that they—not their lawyers—
exercise primary control over private securities litigation; and (3) to encourage 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to pursue valid claims and defendants to fight abusive 
claims.” S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 
683. 
84 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(a) (West 2010) (requiring notice, establishing 
procedure for the appointment of lead plaintiffs and the selection of lead 
counsel). 
85 See § 78u-5.  
86 See § 78u-4(b)(1) (requiring that “the complaint shall specify each 
statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the 
statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or 
omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with 
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed”); § 78u-4(b)(2) (requiring 
“proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind . . . [and that the 
complaint] state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant acted with the required state of mind”).  
87 See § 78u-4(f).  
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settlement.88 The Reform Act may have been somewhat successful 
in curbing meritless litigation through the first of these three 
aspects; however, it also impedes recovery for injured shareholders 
and arguably has a reduced deterrent effect. 
First, the Reform Act added additional class action 
requirements to give investor plaintiffs, rather than their attorneys, 
more control over private litigation.89 In particular, this legislation 
requires disclosure of settlement terms to class members90 and 
restricts attorney fees to “a reasonable percentage of the amount of 
any damages . . . paid to the class.”91 It also requires that the trial 
court appoint a lead plaintiff based on a determination of which 
plaintiff is “most capable of adequately representing the interests 
of class members.”92 The lead plaintiff then determines which 
attorney or firm will act as lead counsel, which is also subject to 
court approval.93 These provisions provide attorneys with more 
time to investigate potential securities violations rather than racing 
to the courthouse to establish lead plaintiff and lead counsel 
designations.94 The general result has been a reduction in abusive 
litigation practices and greater control by institutional investors.95 
Second, the Reform Act created heightened pleading 
                                                          
88 See id.; see generally Judge Amy St. Eve & Bryce C. Pilz, The Fault 
Allocation Provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995—A 
Roadmap for Litigants and Courts, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 187 (2006). 
89 See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
679, 683. 
90 See § 78u-4(a)(7) (requiring that counsel publish or otherwise 
disseminate proposed and final settlement agreements which include 
information such as potential outcome of the case, the reason for settlement, and 
attorneys fees or costs sought). 
91 § 78u-4(a)(6). 
92 See § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i). 
93 See § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v).  
94 See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
679, 690. 
95 See, e.g., Michael A. Perino, Institutional Activism Through Litigation: 
An Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class 
Actions (St. John’s Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Ser., Paper 
No. 06-0055, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=938722 
(discussing the rise of the institutional investor as lead plaintiffs—particularly 
public pension funds). 
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requirements.96 A complaint must state with particularity facts 
supporting allegations of misleading statements and omissions and 
facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter.97 Since the 
enactment of the Reform Act, the dismissal rate of private class 
action securities litigations has nearly doubled.98 Additionally, the 
Reform Act created mandatory sanctions for abusive litigation, in 
violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b),99 giving 
plaintiffs’ counsel incentive to refrain from advancing meritless 
claims.  
Third, the safe harbor provision shields persons from liability 
for false or misleading forward-looking statements unless plaintiffs 
can prove that the speaker made the statements with knowledge of 
their false or misleading content.100 Generally, forward-looking 
statements contain projections regarding performance, financial 
condition, or operational objectives.101 Speakers must make these 
statements upon a reasonable basis and in good faith, and speakers 
must accompany forward-looking information with meaningful 
                                                          
96 See § 78u-4(b)(1) (requiring that a complaint “state with particularity 
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required 
state of mind”).  
97 See generally Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issue & Rights, Inc., 551 U.S. 308 
(2007) (reviewing legislative history and discussing the positions taken by the 
circuit courts). 
98 ELAINE BUCKBERG ET AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS 
IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: ARE WORLDCOM AND ENRON THE 
NEW STANDARD? 3 (2005). 
99 § 78u-4(c). 
100 § 78u-5(c). See also S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 16 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 695: 
Fear that inaccurate projections will trigger the filing of securities class 
action lawsuit has muzzled corporate management. One study found 
that over two-thirds of venture capital firms were reluctant to discuss 
their performance with analysts or the public because of the threat of 
litigation. Anecdotal evidence similarly indicates corporate counsel 
advise clients to say as little as possible, because legions of lawyers 
scrub required filings to ensure that disclosures are as milquetoast as 
possible, so as to provide no grist for the litigation mill. 
(internal citations omitted). 
101 The SEC prohibited forward-looking disclosure until 1979 when it 
created a safe harbor for certain statements made with a reasonable basis and in 
good faith. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (West 2010). 
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cautionary statements.102 The safe harbor provision was included 
to encourage enhanced disclosure and was successful in that 
respect—one study found an immediate increase in both frequency 
and the mean number of forecasts issued by a sample of 523 high 
technology firms.103 This is beneficial because adequate 
information is necessary to maintain a fair and efficient market.104 
Fourth, the Reform Act restricts joint and several liability to 
defendants who “knowingly committed a violation of the securities 
laws” and creates a scheme of proportionate liability in all other 
cases,105 most importantly, for defendants who settle prior to a 
determination of proportionate fault.106 Although in some instances 
solvent defendants must cover an uncollectible share of the 
                                                          
102 § 78u-5; 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (West 2010); S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 16 
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 695. The PSLRA essentially 
codified the common law ‘bespeaks caution’ doctrine. See, e.g., SEC v. 
Merchant Capital, 483 F.3d 747, 767 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The bespeaks caution 
doctrine is ultimately simply ‘shorthand for the well-established principle that a 
statement or omission must be considered in context, so that accompanying 
statements may render it immaterial as a matter of law.’” (quoting Kaufman v. 
Trump’s Castle Funding, 7 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir. 1993))). 
103 Marilyn F. Johnson et al., The Impact of Securities Litigation Reform on 
the Disclosure of Forward-Looking Information by High Technology Firms, 39 
J. ACCT. RES. 297, 323 (2001) (“The increase in prospective disclosure is 
primarily attributable to managers issuing more long horizon forecasts of good 
news and short horizon forecasts of bad news . . . . [W]e document that the 
change in disclosure is increasing in our estimate of firms’ ex ante risk of 
litigation.”). 
104 See In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 7–8 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(“Efficiency refers to the flow of information in the relevant market and the 
effect of that information on the price of the stock.”). 
105 § 78u-4(f). 
106 See § 78u-4(f)(3)(A): 
In any private action, the court shall instruct the jury . . . [or] shall make 
findings, with respect to each covered person and each of the other 
persons claimed by any of the parties to have caused or contributed to 
the loss incurred by the plaintiff, including persons who have entered 
into settlements with the plaintiff or plaintiffs, concerning—(i) whether 
such person violated the securities laws; (ii) the percentage of 
responsibility of such person, measured as a percentage of the total 
fault of all persons who caused or contributed to the loss incurred by 
the plaintiff; and (iii) whether such person knowingly committed a 
violation of the securities laws. 
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judgment due to a co-defendant’s insolvency107—and may then 
seek contribution from the defaulting party108—contribution may 
be limited significantly, based on a plaintiff’s net worth. The 
Reform Act states that: 
[e]ach covered person shall be jointly and severally liable 
for the uncollectible share if the plaintiff establishes that— 
(I) the plaintiff is an individual whose recoverable 
damages under the final judgment are equal to more 
than 10 percent of the net worth of the plaintiff; and 
(II) the net worth of the plaintiff is equal to less than 
$200,000.109 
Where plaintiffs do not fall into either of these categories, the 
“total liability of a covered person [for uncollectible shares] may 
not exceed 50 percent of [his] proportionate share.”110 This aspect 
of the Reform Act was successful in its design because it 
inherently reduces the liability exposure of defendants with deep 
pockets but comparatively less culpability.111 However, this 
scheme of proportionate liability is detrimental to injured 
shareholders because they bear the risk of a defendant’s insolvency 
and ultimately may be inadequately compensated because of their 
net worth.112 
Finally, the Reform Act established a mandatory bar on 
contribution among co-defendants after partial settlement.113 As 
                                                          
107 Covered persons are required to cover uncollectible shares. See § 78u-
4(f)(4); see also § 78u-4(f)(10)(C): 
[T]he term ‘covered person’ means—(i) a defendant in any private 
action arising under this chapter; or (ii) a defendant in any private 
action arising under section 77k of this title, who is an outside director 
of the issuer of the securities that are the subject of the action . . . . 
108 See § 78u-4(f)(5)(A). 
109 See § 78u-4(f)(4)(A)(i). 
110 See § 78u-4(f)(4)(A)(ii). 
111 See 141 CONG. REC. S17934 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
D’Amato). 
112 See § 78u-4(f)(5)(A). 
113 See § 78u-4(f)(7)(A): 
A covered person who settles any private action at any time before final 
verdict or judgment shall be discharged from all claims for contribution 
brought by other persons. Upon entry of the settlement by the court, the 
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one might expect, in complex cases involving multiple defendants, 
a global settlement is not always feasible. As a result, parties often 
enter into partial settlements, involving fewer than all 
defendants.114 In class actions, the trial court must hold a fairness 
hearing and approve a proposed settlement115 because “[j]udicial 
scrutiny over settlements is the most important safeguard against 
inadequate or conflicted representation by class counsel.”116 The 
                                                          
court shall enter a bar order constituting the final discharge of all 
obligations to the plaintiff of the settling covered person arising out of 
the action. The order shall bar all future claims for contribution arising 
out of the action—(i) by any person against the settling covered person; 
and (ii) by the settling covered person against any person, other than a 
person whose liability has been extinguished by the settlement of the 
settling covered person. 
See, e.g., In re Heritage Bond Litig., 546 F.3d 667, 670 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(citing AAL High Yield Bond Fund v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 361 F.3d 
1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that the PSLRA “essentially codified 
federal common law allowing for issuance of a bar order as part of a securities 
fraud class action settlement”)). 
114 See, e.g., In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 572 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 
2009); Heritage, 546 F.3d 667; In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294 
(3d Cir. 2005). 
115 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c), (e). Since a settlement binds all class members, 
“the trial judge [has] the duty of protecting absentees, which is executed by the 
court’s assuring the settlement represents adequate compensation for the release 
of the class claims.” In re PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 421, 
429 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (quoting In re Presidential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Litig., 148 
F.3d 283, 316 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
116 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class 
Action Settlements, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 167, 167 (2009) (analyzing the level 
of judicial scrutiny of class action settlements). See generally Lawrence J. 
Zweifach & Samuel L. Barkin, Recent Developments in the Settlement of 
Securities Class Actions, in 33RD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES 
REGULATION 2001, at 1331–34 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook 
Ser. No. 1279, 2001), available at Westlaw 1279 PLI/Corp 1329 (describing the 
statutory framework governing a shareholder class action and the judicial 
standards applied in determining the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of a 
proffered settlement). In exercising its discretion, the trial court may consider a 
variety of factors, such as 
(1) The complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation; (2) 
The reaction of the class to the proposed settlement; (3) The stage of 
the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) The risks 
of establishing liability; (5) The risks of establishing damages; (6) The 
456 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
driving factor in settlement is a preference for control over the 
outcome rather than uncertainty.117 Federal common law evolved 
so that, following a partial settlement, a trial court would issue an 
order barring co-defendants from seeking indemnity or 
contribution from one another,118 and thereby creating “global 
peace” for the settling parties.119 In return, the non-settling 
                                                          
risks of maintaining the class action through trial; (7) The ability of the 
defendants to withstand a greater judgement; (8) The range of 
reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible 
recovery; and, (9) The range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to 
the best possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation. 
PNC, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 430 (citing Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 
1975)). 
117 See, e.g., AmeriPride Servs. Inc. v. Valley Indus. Servs., Inc., No. CIV. 
S-00-113-LKK JFM, 2007 WL 1946635, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2007): 
[T]he parties have demonstrated that the decision to settle was 
motivated by the desire of each to avoid the significant costs required 
to further litigate this case as well to avoid the uncertainty of litigation. 
Settlement was also motivated in each case by the settling parties’ 
desire for finality . . . . 
118 Defendants have a statutory right of contribution against one another 
under Sections 9 and 18 of the Exchange Act and Section 11 of the Securities 
Act, but not under Sections 12 and 15 of the Securities Act or Sections 16 and 
20A of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78i(e), 78r(b), 77k(f), 77l, 77o, 78p, 
78t-1 (West 2010). There is also an implied right of contribution under Section 
10(b) of the Exchange Act. § 78j(b); Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. 
of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 288 (1993). However, there is no express or implied 
right of indemnification. See, e.g., Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 52 F.3d 478, 483 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (collecting cases). Although the Reform Act only mandates a bar on 
contribution, courts have interpreted this to allow a bar on indemnity as well, 
consistent with prior federal common law practice. See, e.g., HealthSouth, 572 
F.3d at 860 (“We believe that it is highly unlikely that Congress would intend by 
its mere silence to overrule such well-established case law.”). See generally 
David Kaplan, Note, The Scope of Bar Orders in Federal Securities Fraud 
Settlements, 52 DUKE L.J. 211, 218–28 (2002) (discussing the types of claims 
that are barred). Similar practice exists under various state laws. See also, e.g., 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 6304(b) 
(West 2010); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. L. § 15-108(b) (McKinney 2010). 
119 See HealthSouth, 572 F.3d at 862 (“Defendants buy little peace through 
settlement unless they are assured that they will be protected against 
codefendants’ efforts to shift their losses through cross-claims for indemnity, 
contribution, and other causes related to the underlying litigation.” (quoting In 
re U.S. Oil & Gas Litig., 967 F.2d 489, 494 (11th Cir. 1992))); Wm. Bruce 
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defendants received a judgment credit, or “set-off,”120 precluding 
double recovery by plaintiffs and insulating the non-settling 
defendants from paying more than their share, based on a 
determination of proportionate liability.121 Bar orders facilitate pre-
trial settlement of complex class actions, which is favorable 
because it results in financial savings to the parties and 
conservation of judicial resources.122 However, civil settlements 
may “do a poor job of sorting strong claims of fraud from non-
fraudulent statements that were proved wrong only in hindsight. 
[Since] both weak and strong cases lead to settlements, the 
deterrent effect of class actions [is] diluted because both innocent 
                                                          
Davis, Note, Multiple Defendant Settlement in 10b-5: Good Faith Contribution 
Bar, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1253, 1254 n.6 (1989) (“If a defendant’s settlement with 
the plaintiff does not sever liability to the nonsettling defendants, the settling 
defendants remains potentially liable for the entire judgment by virtue of a 
cross-claim for contribution . . . . [and] there is little incentive to settle . . . .”).  
120 Prior to the Reform Act, plaintiffs generally argued for a pro tanto 
approach, or a set-off based on the amount paid by the settling defendant, and 
defendants generally argued for a relative fault approach, or a set-off based on 
the relative fault of the settling defendant. See generally James J. Hagan, LL.B. 
& Joseph M. McLaughlin, Fairness in the Balance: The Use of Bar Orders and 
Judgment Reduction in the Settlement of Multi-Defendant Securities Litigation, 
1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 29 (1994). The Reform Act provides the non-settling 
defendant with the greater of the two. See, e.g., PNC, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 440–42 
(recognizing that the Reform Act “assur[es] that the class bears all risk in 
brokering a partial settlement and retains the incentive to ascertain and prove 
each defendant’s fair share of damages”). 
121 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(f)(7)(B) (West 2010): 
If a covered person enters into a settlement with the plaintiff prior to 
final verdict or judgment, the verdict or judgment shall be reduced by 
the greater of (i) an amount that corresponds to the percentage of 
responsibility of that covered person; or (ii) the amount paid to the 
plaintiff by that covered person. 
122 See, e.g., PNC, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 429–30 (“[T]here is an overriding 
public interest in settling class action litigation, and it is to be encouraged by the 
courts, particularly in complex settings that will consume substantial judicial 
resources and have the potential to linger for years.” (quoting In re Warfarin 
Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 535 (3d Cir. 2004))); 141 CONG. REC. 
S17933–34 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. D’Amato) (“The threat of 
a protracted securities class action lawsuit is powerful. Companies pony up huge 
settlements rather than face the time and expense of a class action lawsuit . . . 
.”). 
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and wrongful conduct leads to sanctions.”123 
Additionally, proportionate liability in conjunction with the 
mandatory bar on post-settlement contribution creates inefficient 
incentives during settlement negotiations because “on one hand, if 
the [individual defendants] remain in an action where [an] 
imbalance of wealth is present, the plaintiff will be able to collect 
the entirety of a judgment from other [] violators regardless of 
what percentage of responsibility the jury assigns to the [individual 
defendants].”124 On the other hand, if the individual defendants 
settle, the set-off they receive will reduce the plaintiffs’ overall 
recovery.125 Additionally, in cases where the defendants with deep 
pockets do not settle, plaintiffs have little incentive to give up a 
substantial proportion of their potential recovery by settling with 
individual defendants.126  
Following the Reform Act, there was an initial decline in 
federal court filings of securities litigation.127 However, this deficit 
was only a reflection of a temporary shift in forum selection from 
federal to state courts.128 In 1998, Congress enacted the Securities 
                                                          
123 Shareholder Wealth, supra note 8, at 784. 
124 In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288(DLC), 2005 WL 
335201, at *15 n.20 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2005) (“It should be noted that this 
disincentive toward settlement with comparatively less wealthy parties is created 
in the Exchange Act context as well when the facts are such that one or more 
wealthy defendants are likely to be subject to joint and several liability for 
knowing conduct.”). 
125 Id. at *15. 
126 Id. 
127 MUKESH BAJAJ ET AL., CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS 
ACTION SETTLEMENTS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 3 (2000), available at 
http://securities.stanford.edu/research/studies/20001116_SSRN_Bajaj.html 
(“[T]he number of cases filed in Federal courts immediately following PSLRA 
dropped from 191 in 1995 to 119 in 1996.”). 
128 See Richard H. Walker et al., The New Securities Class Action: Federal 
Obstacles, State Detours, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 641, 643–44 (1997): 
A new breed of forum shopping [] developed resulting in [] an increase 
in standalone state securities class actions . . . . 40% of the securities 
class actions filed in the first ten months of 1996 were filed in state 
courts, compared to slightly more than 20% during 1995. 
See also JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST & MICHAEL A. PERINO, CORNERSTONE 
RESEARCH, SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM: THE FIRST YEAR’S EXPERIENCE 
(1997), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/research/studies/19970227first 
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Litigation Uniform Standards Act, which prohibited plaintiffs from 
filing a majority of class action securities litigations in state 
courts.129 A decade later, class action securities litigations are filed 
in federal courts in similar numbers as in pre-Reform Act years.130 
Additionally, just about every case still results in settlement,131 
indicating that once a claim survives a dispositive motion, 
defendants are in a similar position as they were prior to the 
Reform Act, favoring settlement to uncertainty and seeking to 
avoid the costs of litigation and discovery, rather than contesting 
liability.132 
                                                          
yr_firstyr.html (“About 26% of litigation activity has moved from federal to 
state court.”). 
129 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb(f)(1) (West 2010): 
No covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of 
any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or 
Federal court by any private party alleging—(A) a misrepresentation or 
omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a 
covered security; or (B) that the defendant used or employed any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a covered security. 
130 CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS, 2008: A 
YEAR IN REVIEW 2 (2008), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearing 
house_research/2008_YIR/20090106_YIR08_Full_Report.pdf (“A total of 210 
federal securities class actions . . . were filed in 2008, a 19 percent increase over 
the 176 filings in 2007 . . . . 91 of those filings are related to the 
subprime/liquidity crisis.”). The yearly average between 1997 and 2007 was 
192. Id. 
131 STEPHANIE PLANCICH & SVETLANA STARYKH, NERA ECON. 
CONSULTING, 2008 TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS 7 (2008), available 
at http://www.nera.com/image/Recent_Trends_Report_12-08.pdf (finding that 
of the cases resolved in a five year period, 45% were dismissed and 55% 
reached settlement and that “[f]or example, only four of the cases filed in 2000 
[went] to trial, and all settled with at least one defendant during the trial”). 
132 Moreover, investor recovery has not improved. In the first half of 2010, 
for example, “the median ratio of settlements to investor losses [was still only] 
3.1%, a proportion higher than or equal to that observed in any year since 2002.” 
JORDAN MILEV ET AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, TRENDS 2010 MID-YEAR 
STUDY 2 (WEST 2010), available at http://www.nera.com/67_6813.htm. See 
also, e.g., In re Marsh & McLennan Cos. Sec. Litig., No. 04 Civ. 8144(CM), 
2009 WL 5178546, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2009) (“‘The fact that a proposed 
settlement may only amount to a fraction of the potential recovery does not, in 
and of itself, mean that the proposed settlement is grossly inadequate and should 
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II. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS FOR CIVIL ENFORCEMENT 
Despite objections from several members of Congress, 
including Senator Dodd, a lead sponsor of the bill,133 and Arthur 
Levitt, then Chairman of the SEC,134 the Reform Act was passed 
without two significant proposed amendments intended “(i) to 
increase the uncollectible share provision for proportionate liability 
from 50% to 100%; and (ii) to provide for liability in private 
actions under Rule 10b-5 for aiders and abettors of primary 
securities law violators.”135 Future incorporation of these 
provisions would ensure greater recovery for injured shareholders 
and increase deterrence through broader exposure to civil liability. 
A. Shifting the Burden of Insolvency 
An individual defendant may be unable to satisfy a large 
judgment awarded in a class action.136 Under the current scheme of 
proportionate liability, plaintiffs must bear the risk that a defendant 
                                                          
be disapproved.’” (quoting City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 455 
& n.2 (2d Cir. 1974) (“In fact there is no reason, at least in theory, why a 
satisfactory settlement could not amount to a hundredth or even a thousandth 
part of a single percent of the potential recovery.”))). 
133 141 CONG. REC. S17937 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
D’Amato (quoting Sen. Dodd)). 
134 See Letter from Arthur Levitt & Steve Wallman, reprinted in 141 CONG. 
REC. S17935 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (“[W]e have consistently advocated 
reversal of Supreme Court decisions of Lampf and Central Bank. It is 
unfortunate that Congress has not restored these investor protections that were 
removed by the Supreme Court . . . .”).  
135 See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
679, 683. 
136 Id. at 14. See, e.g., Tucker v. Scrushy, No. CV 02-5212 AEH, 2009 WL 
1709245 (Cir. Ct. Ala. June 18, 2009) (rendering a pre-set-off judgment of more 
than three billion dollars against the chief executive officer in a shareholder 
derivative action for securities fraud). See also In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. 
Litig., 226 F.R.D. 186, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (Congress intended to promote 
early settlement while “ensuring that a non-settling party would not be exposed 
to liability for more than its percentage of responsibility for plaintiffs’ 
damages.”); St. Eve & Pilz, supra note 88, at 210–11 (“[T]he plaintiff will bear 
the risk of the jury assigning a percentage of fault to an insolvent defendant . . . 
.”). 
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may be insolvent, instead of allowing this risk to fall on the other, 
solvent defendants.137 The Reform Act sought to protect relatively 
less culpable parties with deep pockets.138 However, protecting any 
culpable party is achieved at the detriment to injured shareholders, 
who are victims of the fraud.139 As proposed during the formation 
of the Reform Act, increasing the uncollectible share coverage 
from 50 percent to 100 percent would shift the risks of insolvency 
back to the parties who caused the losses. 
B. A Private Right of Action Against Aiders and Abetters 
Although the Reform Act failed to overrule prior Supreme 
Court rulings,140 legislators have since proposed an additional 
amendment that would reinstate a private action for aiding and 
abetting violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, echoing the 
calls for reform that followed Central Bank:141  
For purposes of any private civil action implied under 
[Title 15], any person that knowingly or recklessly provides 
substantial assistance to another person in violation of this 
title, or of any rule or regulation issued under this title, 
shall be deemed to be in violation of this title to the same 
extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided.142 
                                                          
137 Donald C. Langevoort, The Reform of Joint and Several Liability Under 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Proportionate Liability, 
Contribution Rights and Settlement Effects, 51 BUS. LAW. 1157, 1159 (1996).  
138 S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 
685. 
139 Langevoort, supra note 137, at 1160–61 (“As between innocent 
investors and defendants who recklessly caused a securities fraud, why should 
the risk of defendant insolvency fall on the victims rather than the participants? . 
. . Why limit the accountants’ liability and leave the victims significantly 
undercompensated?”).  
140 Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008); 
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 
164 (1994). 
141 See, e.g., David J. Baum, The Aftermath of Central Bank of Denver: 
Private Aiding and Abetting Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 44 
AM. U. L. REV. 1817 (1995). 
142 Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009, S. 
1551, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill. 
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Since outside actors are now only proportionately liable for 
their violations and are shielded from civil liability for aiding and 
abetting violations,143 they lack accountability and incentive to 
fulfill their roles as gatekeepers. Increased liability exposure 
through modification of the proportionate liability scheme and 
codification of an aiding and abetting right of action would provide 
greater incentive for external actors to object to or report, rather 
than acquiesce to and thereby enable, securities violations.144 
Additionally, if outside entities with deep pockets were held jointly 
and severally liable,145 injured plaintiffs would not bear the risk of 
a single defendant’s insolvency.146 If these changes were made, the 
                                                          
xpd?bill=s111-1551 (Introduced by Sen. Specter [D-PA]). In 2010, 
Representative Waters [D-NY] introduced a bill with identical language. 
Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2010, H.R. 5042, 
111th Cong. (2010), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111: 
H.R.5042:. 
143 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Limited Options: The Authors of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act Had the Right Diagnosis for the Corporate Scandals of the 1990s. But 
that Doesn’t Mean They Had the Cure, 2003-DEC LEGAL AFF. 52, 52 (2003) 
[hereinafter Limited Options].  
144 See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S17937 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of 
Sen. D’Amato) (“Aiding and abetting liability has been critically important in 
deterring individuals from assisting possible fraudulent acts by others.” (quoting 
Sen. Dodd)). 
Persons who knowingly or recklessly assist the perpetration of a fraud 
may be insulated from liability to private parties if they act behind the 
scenes and do not themselves make statements directly or indirectly 
that are relied upon by investors. Because this is conduct that should be 
deterred, Congress should enact legislation to restore aiding and 
abetting liability in private actions. 
Id. (quoting SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt). See also Limited Options, supra note 
143, at 52, 55 (“[S]candals typically involved fraud by committee . . . . How did 
[Enron] learn to manipulate earnings in new state-of-the-art ways? It was taught 
to—by accountants, investment bankers, law firms, and banks . . . .”). 
145 See, e.g., Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 193 n.2 (“All who actively participate 
in any manner in the commission of a tort, or who command, direct, advise, 
encourage, aid or abet its commission, are jointly and severally liable therefore.” 
(citing 1 T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 244 (3d ed. 1906))). 
146 See McDermott, supra note 66, at 1088–89 (“Aiding and abetting 
liability has become enormously important in recent years. Because the primary 
wrongdoer often is insolvent or bankrupt when the fraud is discovered, plaintiffs 
typically sue all the parties connected with a transaction, even if the connection 
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cost of liability insurance might rise to the point where it would be 
more efficient for large entities to self-insure through enhanced 
internal controls and diligence than to obtain insurance from a 
third-party.147  
III. PROPOSED ENHANCEMENT OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 
In addition, or in the alternative, enhanced public enforcement 
could provide increased deterrence of securities fraud. Incentives 
for directors and officers, such as exorbitant salaries and bonuses 
paid after purported success, may overcome the deterrent effects of 
exposure to civil liability.148 Additionally, insurance policies,149 
                                                          
is highly attenuated, in search of a ‘deep pocket.’”). 
147 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., A Statutory and Case Law Primer on 
Due Diligence Under the Federal Securities Laws, in CONDUCTING DUE 
DILIGENCE 1995, at 13 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. 1995, 
1995), available at Westlaw 886 PLI/Corp 11 (describing due diligence 
requirements for primary actors to avoid liability under SEC Rule 10b-5 and 
other securities provisions); Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling 
Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 687, 693 (1997): 
[E]ntity liability can lead companies to institute “preventive measures” 
that deter by making misconduct more difficult or expensive for 
wrongdoers, or by reducing the illicit benefits of unpunished (or 
successful) misconduct, without affecting the probability that it is 
detected by enforcement officials. Such measures can assume many 
forms, ranging from personnel policies—for example, firing price 
fixers and raising the salaries of law abiding managers—to 
sophisticated financial controls, screening procedures, and similar 
mechanisms for limiting agents’ opportunities to commit misconduct. 
The commonality is that these preventive measures reduce the returns 
or increase the costs of misconduct to culpable agents—and so enhance 
deterrence—without affecting the probability that the firm is 
sanctioned. 
148 John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate Scandals, in SARBANES-
OXLEY INSTITUTE: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE, 
AUDITING, AND OTHER ISSUES 523–24 (ALI-ABA’S THIRD ANNUAL ADVANCE, 
Ser. No. SK017, 2004) [hereinafter Theory of Scandals], available at Westlaw, 
SK017 ALI-ABA 519: 
As of 1990, the median [CEO of an S&P 500 Industrial company] 
made $1.25 million with 92% of that paid in cash and 8% in equity. But 
during the 1990s, both the scale and composition of executive 
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employment contracts,150 and internal governance provisions often 
provide indemnification for individual defendants who settle prior 
                                                          
compensation changed. By 2001, the median CEO of an S&P industrial 
company was earning over $6 million, of which 66% was in equity. 
Obviously, when you pay the CEO with stock options, you create 
incentives for short-term financial manipulation and accounting 
gamesmanship. Not only is this obvious, but financial economists have 
confirmed it, finding a strong statistical correlation between higher 
levels of equity compensation and financial restatements. CEO 
compensation as a multiple of average employee compensation is now 
531:1 in the U.S. . . . . 
See also, e.g., Declaration of Ira Lee Sorkin in Support of Defendant Bernard L. 
Madoff’s Motion for Stay and Reinstatement of Bail Pending Sentencing 
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3143(a) at Ex. F, United States v. Madoff, No. 09-
1025-cr (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Sorkin Decl.] (describing financial 
condition of defendant, which included assets worth approximately $823 
million). 
149 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An 
Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1570 
(“D&O insurance now protects both the individual’s assets and those of the 
corporation. As a result, allocation seemingly became unnecessary, because one 
insurer covered the exposure of virtually everyone.”). There are two sides to this 
argument. On one hand, an inability to shift liability through indemnification 
may deter competent people from serving. On the other hand, courts and 
commentators have generally recognized that indemnification conflicts with the 
goals of encouraging diligence and deterring intentional and negligent violations 
of securities laws. See, e.g., In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 572 F.3d 854, 
862 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 229.512(h)(3) (West 2010) (stating that 
the SEC’s position is that indemnification to officers and directors for liabilities 
arising under the Securities Act is against public policy and such 
indemnification is unenforceable, with the exception for expenses incurred in 
successful defense of any action)); Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 52 F.3d 481, 485 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (“[C]ontractual indemnification allows an underwriter to shift its 
entire liability to the issuer before any allegation of wrongdoing or a 
determination of fault.”); In re PNC Fin. Servs. Group, 440 F. Supp. 2d 421, 442 
(W.D. Pa. 2006) (“Enforcing a claim for contractual indemnification, even 
where the defendant’s liability is premised on negligence under the securities 
laws, would run counter to the prophylactic purpose of ensuring accurate 
investigating and reporting by all accountable parties responsible for public 
reports, particularly those who assume roles of verification and supervision.”). 
150 But see HealthSouth, 572 F.3d 854 (upholding bar order that invalidated 
indemnity provision in CEO’s employment contract). 
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to any determination of fault.151 In a recent five-year study by the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, more than 10 percent of 
all listed companies had issued restated financials—“a serious 
event that, depending on its magnitude, often results in a private 
class action, an SEC enforcement proceeding, a major stock price 
drop, and/or a management shake up.”152 After the passage of the 
Reform Act, lawsuits alleging accounting fraud and insider trading 
increased significantly.153 While many more cases are dismissed 
because of the heightened pleading standard,154 discounting 
meritless cases that survived the former pleading standard, these 
numbers may indicate that the incidence of misconduct has 
remained consistent.  
Enhanced criminal enforcement and mandatory minimum 
sentences may be a more effective deterrent than any scheme of 
civil liability. Although it is difficult to measure the deterrent 
effect of either civil liability or criminal enforcement, “[a] 
consensus appears to exist that greater use should be made of the 
criminal law in combating securities fraud and accounting 
irregularities.”155 Criminal actions may be more successful for 
several reasons: conduct that is not actionable as civil securities 
fraud may be criminally prosecuted;156 the materiality standard for 
wire and mail fraud is lower than for securities fraud;157 the safe 
harbor does not shield speakers from criminal liability;158 aiders 
and abettors are subject to criminal liability;159 and criminal 
                                                          
151 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(f)(3) (West 2010). 
152 Theory of Scandals, supra note 148, at 521 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCT. 
OFFICE, FINANCIAL STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS: TRENDS, MARKET IMPACTS, 
REGULATORY RESPONSES AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 4 (2002)). 
153 Do Merits Matter More?, supra note 39, at 637. 
154 See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
155 John C. Coffee, Jr., Professor, Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law, Statement 
Before the Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs (July 10, 2002) [hereinafter 
Getting Tough], reprinted in 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 245, 245 (2003). 
156 See Wendy Gerwick Couture, White Collar Crime’s Gray Area: The 
Anomaly of Criminalizing Conduct Not Civilly Actionable, 72 ALB. L. REV. 1, 
3–4 (2009). 
157 Id. at 6. 
158 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-5 (West 2010) (creating safe harbor provision in 
private securities litigation). 
159 Couture, supra note 156, at 15. 
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indictments are less likely to be dismissed before trial than civil 
complaints.160 
In theory, “a penalty of 25 years imprisonment with a 
probability of .01 is unlikely to be as effective a deterrent as a 
[penalty of] 2.5 year[s] [imprisonment] . . . with a probability of 
.1.”161 Compliance arguably depends on the expectation of 
detection and prosecution; if actors believe that their the risk of 
punishment is high, they may be more likely to comply than if they 
believe that their the risk is low.162 Therefore, “the passage of 
tough mandatory sentences that impose exemplary sentences on 
white collar offenders [may] do less to achieve deterrence than 
investment in enforcement and detection.”163 
A remaining consideration in criminal actions is the 
compensation of injured shareholders.164 Although the government 
may seek forfeiture,165 individuals who are found guilty of 
securities violations may have long since enjoyed the profits of 
their crimes,166 meaning that recovered funds are insignificant 
when compared with investor losses.167 Additionally, trial courts 
may circumvent crime victims’ statutory right to restitution168—
because of complex issues such as loss causation—to avoid unduly 
                                                          
160 Id. at 21. 
161 Symposium, Federal Sentencing Policy for Economic Crimes and New 
Technology Offenses: What Social Science Can Contribute to Sentencing Policy 
for Economic Crimes, at 23 (2000), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2000 
sympo/2000sympo.htm. 
162 Getting Tough, supra note 155, at 246. 
163 Id. 
164 See generally Couture, supra note 156, at 39–40. 
165 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 981; 982 (West 2010). 
166 See Sorkin Decl., supra note 148. 
167 For example, it is estimated that Bernard Madoff caused $65 billion in 
losses to investors, but forfeited only $823 million. See Sorkin Decl., supra note 
148; Michael Moore, The 2009 Time 100: Bernie Madoff, TIME, Apr. 30, 2009, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,189 
4410_1893837_1894189,00.html. See also MILEV ET AL., supra note 132. 
168 Crime Victim Restitution Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(6) (West 
2010). Specifically, restitution is available for any “offense against property 
under [Title 18] . . . including any offense committed by fraud or deceit.” 
Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii) 
(West 2010). 
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long or complicated sentencing.169 
CONCLUSION 
Enforcement and exposure to civil liability produces both costs 
and benefits. For example, harsher punishments and greater 
liability may influence companies to prefer foreign markets.170 
However, it is important to recognize that “[s]ecurities fraud has 
macro-economic consequences. It injures not only investors, but 
the public generally by raising the cost of capital for all 
corporations and thereby retarding economic growth, increasing 
interest rates, and producing inevitable layoffs.”171 Moreover, there 
                                                          
169 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3663A(3), 3771(d)(2) (West 2010); FED. R. CRIM. P. 
60(b)(3); 150 CONG. REC. S10910 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. 
Kyl): 
[A] court may find that the sheer number of victims is so large that it is 
impracticable to accord each victim the rights in this bill . . . . [T]he 
court must then fashion a procedure that still gives effect to the bill and 
yet takes into account the impracticability. 
See, e.g., United States v. Saltsman, No. 07-CR-641, 2007 WL 4232985, at *1 
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007) (finding that ‘tens of thousands’ of potential victims 
made identification, location, and notice impracticable). See also § 
3663(a)(1)(B); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5E1.1(b)(2); 
8B1.1(b)(2) (2009); S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 18–19 (1995), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 931 (“It is the committee’s intent that courts order full 
restitution to all identifiable victims of covered offenses, while guaranteeing that 
the sentencing phase of criminal trials do not become fora for the determination 
of facts and issues better suited to civil proceedings.”). Generally, courts also 
recognize that alternative civil remedies are available for injured investors—the 
Mandatory Victim Restitution Act precludes double recovery and an award of 
restitution is ultimately reduced by the damages recovered in any civil action. 18 
U.S.C.A. § 3664(j)(2) (West 2010). See also, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 309 
F.3d 611 (9th Cir. 2002). However, as an alternative, the government may 
compensate victims from assets obtained through forfeiture. See, e.g., In re W.R. 
Huff Asset Mgmt Co., 409 F.3d 555 (2d Cir. 2005). 
170 ABA COMM. ON FED. REG. OF SEC., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE OF 
SECURITIES, reprinted in 47 BUS. LAW. 1083, 1138 n.270 (1992) (“[T]he layers 
of regulation and enforcement currently in place within our country are deterring 
international business ventures and securities offerings participation within the 
United States.”). 
171 Getting Tough, supra note 155, at 247. See also Law and the Market, 
supra note 31, at 230 (“[H]igher enforcement intensity gives the U.S. economy a 
468 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
is circularity underlying securities class actions; although they may 
result in substantial settlements, damages assessed directly against 
an issuer, or indirectly through the indemnification of its directors 
and officers, ultimately come from shareholders’ equity.172  
The Reform Act had small successes in eliciting enhanced 
issuer disclosure and filtering out some strike suits. However, it 
reduced the chances that injured shareholders will be made whole 
through class actions and missed an opportunity to codify a private 
right of action for aiding and abetting violations of Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5. In the wake of America’s most recent financial 
crisis,173 additional oversight for issuers, officers and directors, and 
third-party gatekeepers should be a legislative priority. For 
defendants, deterrence is a question of pricing and prohibiting.174 
Where civil liability exceeds the ability of culpable actors to pay, 
pricing may be irrelevant. Ultimately, it may be more effective to 
shift the focus to prevention through deterrence, which may be 
achieved more efficiently through changes in the scheme of 
proportionate liability, the expansion of liability for outside 
entities, and/or the enhancement of regulatory and criminal 
enforcement. 
                                                          
lower cost of capital and higher securities valuations.”). 
172 Symposium, Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on 
Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1545 (2006): 
From a compensatory perspective, the conclusion seems inescapable 
that the securities class action performs poorly. Settlements recover 
only a very small share of investor losses. NERA Economic Consulting 
annually prepares a table showing the ratio of settlements to investor 
losses, and between 1991 and 2004, this ratio has never exceeded 7.2% 
. . . . 
(citing ELAINE BUCKBERG ET AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS 
IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: ARE WORLDCOM AND ENRON THE 
NEW STANDARD? 6 (2005)). 
173 See, e.g., Tucker v. Scrushy, No. CV 02-5212 AEH, 2009 WL 1709245 
(Cir. Ct. Ala. June 18, 2009). 
174 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the 
Criminal and Civil Law Models—And What Can be Done About It, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1875 (1992) (discussing the differences between pricing and sanctioning 
undesirable conduct). 
